CMSC 35401: Topics in Machine Learning
The Interplay of Learning and Game Theory (Autumn 2022)
Basic Information
Class Location: K 102 (the class is fully in person unless noted otherwise)Class Time: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 2:00pm to 3:20pm
Instructor: Haifeng Xu
- Email: haifengxu AT uchicago.edu
- Office: Crerar 260
- Office hours: Tuesday 3:30 to 4:30 pm (rightly after class)
- Email: minbiaohan AT uchicago.edu
- Office Hours: Wed/Fri 1 - 2 pm; Room: JCL 300 Research Commons
Announcements
- Sept 20: Course website is up!
- Oct 1: First HW is out; due 10/18.
- Oct 20: Second HW is out; due Nov 3rd.
- Oct 23: Projection instruction is out; proposal is due also on Nov 3rd.
- Nov 17: Third HW is out; due Dec 6.
- Dec 1: here is the peer grading sheet for project presentations.
Course Description
Welcome! This is a graduate level course covering topics at the interface between machine learning and game theory. In many economic or game-theoretic applications, the problem either lacks sufficient data or is too complex. In such cases, machine learning theory helps to design more realistic or practical algorithms. Conversely, in many application of machine learning or prediction, the algorithms have to obtain data from self-interested agents whose objectives are not aligned with the algorithm designer. In those settings, the algorithms have to take into account these agents' strategic behaviors. These problems form an intriguing interplay between machine learning and game theory, and have attracted a lot of recent research attention. This course will discuss several recent research directions in this space. Our goal is to cover (some selected) basic results in the following four directions. Alone the way, we will also cover necessary basics to game theory, learning theory, mechanism design, prediction and information aggregation.
Topics covered in this course, and tentative syllabus:
- First Half: Learning for Game Theory
- (week 1) Linear programming and duality
- (week 2-3) Intro to game theory, zero-sum games
- (week 3-4) No regret learning and its convergence to equilibrium
- (week 5) Bandit algorithms
- Second Half: Game Theory for Learning
- (week 5-6) Mechanisms for eliciting information: scoring rules and prediction markets
- (week 7) Bayesian persuasion, and pricing of information
- (week 8-9) Learning from strategic data sources
- (week 9) Fairness tradeoffs in prediction
Tentative Schedule and Readings (slides will be posted after each lecture)
Week | Lectures | Readings |
---|---|---|
1 (Sep 27) | Introduction [slides] | Kleinberg/Leighton paper | 2 (Sep 29) | Basics of LPs [slides] | Chapter 2.1, 2.2, 4.3 of Convex Optimization by Boyd and Vandenberghe | 3 (Oct 4) | LP duality [slides] | Lecture notes 5 and 6 of an optimization course by Trevisan | 4 (Oct 6) | Intro to Game Theory (I) [slides] | Section 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 of an game theory book by Shoham and Leyton-Brown | 5 (Oct 11) | Intro to Game Theory (II) [slides] | Equilibrium analysis of GANs by Arora et al. | 6 (Oct 13) | Intro to Online Learning [slides] | 7 (Oct 18) | Multiplicative Weight [slides] | A survey paper on MWU and its applications by Arora et al. | 8 (Oct 20) | Swap Regret [slides] | A note by Balcan on converting regret to swap regret | 9 (Oct 25) | Multi-Armed Bandits [slides] | Section 2 and 3 of the Book by Bubeck and Cesa-Bianch on Bandits | 10 (Oct 27) | Prediction Markets (PMs) [slides] | Notes from a similar course by Waggoner | 11 (Nov 1) | PMs and Scoring Rules [slides] | The original paper including all presented results | 12 (Nov 3) | Peer Prediction [slides] | Bayesian Truth Serum paper | 13 (Nov 8) | Bayesian Persuasion [slides] | The original Bayesian Persuasion paper | 14 (Nov 10) | Pricing of Information [slides] | The Optimal Pricing of Information paper | 15 (Nov 15) | Strategic Learning I [slides] | PAC-learning for Strategic Classification paper | 16 (Nov 17) | Strategic Learning II [slides] | How Can ML Induce Right Efforts paper | (Nov 22) | Thanksgiving, No Lecture | (Nov 24) | Thanksgiving, No Lecture | 17 (Nov 29) | Tradeoffs of Fairness [slides] | Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination | (Dec 1) | Project presentations [schedule] |
Homework
Due date | Homework | Note |
---|---|---|
10/18 | Homework 1 | Here is a HW solution template in case you need one |
11/03 | Homework 2 | Good luck! |
proposal due 11/03 | Projection Instructions | Email us if need any help |
12/06 | Homework 3 | Good luck! |
Requirements and Grading
Homework assignments will count for 50% of the grade. There will be 3 assignments, roughly 3 weeks apart each. The homework will be proof-based, and are intended to be very challenging. Collaboration and discussion among students is allowed, even encouraged. However, students must write up the solutions independently. The remaining 50% of the grade is allocated to a final project. Students can team up for the project and each team should consist of 2 to 4 people. The project can: (1) study a research problem relevant to the course (ideally, also related to your own research) and write a report about your research findings; or (2) survey a related research topic by reading papers in that area and write an overview report of the area. More detailed instructions will come later.There is no midterm or final for the course.
Late Homework Policy : Each student is allowed one late homework for at most two days from the due date. You may choose whichever homework to use this chance (or not use it). No additional late homework will be accepted.